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The Problem
The human and social costs of disability are well known, and 
increases in the number of beneficiaries and in expenditures are both 
causes of concern. The real economic cost of disability, namely, the 
lost production from individuals not at work, has been growing rapidly 
in recent years. Nominal, or budget, outlays have also been increasing 
as private and public payments for disability benefits have soared in the 
last 20 years. Using a nonrandom sample, a recent study estimated that 
employers were paying 8 percent of payroll for disability-related 
expenses, including both direct and indirect costs of disability (Che- 
lius, Galvin, and Owens 1992).
At the same time, a very specific issue has arisen in the Social Secu 
rity Disability Insurance (DI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) 
programs. The return-to-work rate has declined precipitously since the 
1970s. According to the Disability Policy Panel of the National Acad 
emy of Social Insurance:
The proportion of beneficiaries who leave the disabled-worker 
benefit rolls because of recovery has never been large. During the 
1970s, it generally ranged between 1.5 and 2.5 percent of the ben 
efit rolls. Terminations due to recovery peaked in the early 1980s, 
when SSA pursued an aggressive policy of reviewing the rolls and 
terminating benefits. In the 1990s, terminations for recovery are at
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an all time low, in 1991-1993 they are below 0.5 percent (National 
Academy of Social Insurance 1994, p. 82).
We take this "recovery" or return-to-work issue as the impetus for 
our paper. 1 Are private sector actors more successful in returning per 
sons with disabilities to work? How do they do it? Are there lessons 
that can be learned about return to work from the private sector that 
could be transferred to public sector programs? What problems would 
have to be overcome to translate private solutions to the public sector?
Equity and efficiency considerations are key in evaluating policy. 
Economic efficiency requires that we obtain the maximum amount of 
goods, services, and leisure time from the human and other resources 
in society. Thus, any human resource that is unemployed or underem 
ployed reduces the total production available for all to consume and 
thereby decreases the economic well-being of all citizens. Economic 
equity is harder to define, but ultimately it deals with the distribution of 
those goods, services, and leisure time that a society can produce. 
Some use a standard of equity that specifies "to each according to his 
or her contributions"; others prefer "to each according to his or her 
needs." In either event, the issue is who gets to consume what share of 
total production (Okun 1975).
There is also another sense of equity, and that is the equity of partic 
ipation. For the last three decades or more, we as a society, have been 
concerned about the full and equal participation of racial minorities, 
females, older Americans, and persons with disabilities in the eco 
nomic life of the country. We have enacted statutes attempting to pro- 
mote the opportunity for such participation by outlawing 
discrimination against these groups. In some cases, we have even 
required "affirmative action" to try and involve disadvantaged groups, 
especially where their participation has been prevented or hindered by 
past discrimination. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 
(ADA) seeks to remove barriers to employment for persons with func 
tional limitations by requiring employers to reasonably accommodate 
these individuals' disabilities. The clear goal of ADA is to facilitate the 
greater participation of persons with disabilities in the world of work 
by removing the environmental and societal barriers to participation 
and integration.
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However, if individuals are being encouraged to "maximize" their 
lability rather than their ability in order to receive cash or in-kind 
benefits, we will have a loss of both efficiency and equity. We will lose 
efficiency in the sense that society will produce less than it could if all 
resources were fully employed. We will lose equity if some individuals 
are not participating, thereby not contributing their share to producing 
the goods, services, and leisure time that we are all consuming. In this 
sense, equity and efficiency both mandate the optimum participation of 
persons with disabilities in economic life.
Refraining the Return-to-work Issue
Traditional Approach
Before the disability management movement, attention to return-to- 
work or stay-at-work goals for people with functional impairments was 
rare in the private as well as in the public sector. A medical model of 
treatment and recovery was dominant, with the emphasis on benefit 
administration, not return to work. That is, the process moved in a lin 
ear sequence from diagnosis of impairment to independent provision 
of medical treatment, passive recovery at home, and claim monitoring 
at eligibility points by the carrier. Only when it became clear that the 
injured employee was failing to return to work was recourse to the 
vocational rehabilitation system considered.
Over the past decade, there has been growing disenchantment with 
the medical or clinical model of disability and with the outcomes of the 
traditional approach to vocational rehabilitation. Meanwhile, an eco 
logical model of disability has gained acceptance. That is, a given indi- 
vidual with an impairment functions in interaction with an 
environment that has certain attitudinal, physical, economic, and policy 
characteristics, which, in large part, determine whether the conse 
quences of an impairment will result in a work disability. Increasingly, 
disability has become recognized as an interactive phenomenon, not 
simply deriving from the medical or even the functional aspects of the 
impairing condition (Berkowitz 1985).
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From a public policy perspective, this changing viewpoint has led to 
additions to the state-federal program of vocational rehabilitation, with 
the inclusion of such approaches as independent living services and 
supported employment. We have also seen the de-emphasis of the clin 
ical model of vocational rehabilitation services in the 1992 amend 
ments to the Rehabilitation Act (which governs the federal-state 
vocational rehabilitation system), particularly in regard to determina 
tion of eligibility. More fundamentally, the ecological or sociopolitical 
view of disability fueled the development and adoption of the ADA, 
explicitly changing the focus to the capabilities of persons with disabil 
ities and requiring the larger environment to provide reasonable 
accommodation to allow for the participation of this "minority" group 
of citizens.
Further, subsequent evaluations of the modest employment out 
comes achieved by the state-federal system (General Accounting 
Office [GAO] 1993) have recently motivated the Council of State 
Administrators of Vocational Rehabilitation (CSAVR 1993) to launch 
an initiative that calls for significant linkage with the employer com 
munity, including disability management efforts, and emphasizes 
employment as the desirable outcome. In summary, the service model 
that ignores the labor market until the end of a lengthy process has 
been identified by virtually all constituents as a flawed approach to 
employment for people with disabilities (CSAVR 1993; Stubbins 1982; 
Vandergoot 1994; GAO 1993).
The Disability Management Approach
During the late 1970s and early 1980s, a confluence of economic 
and policy factors led to heightened awareness of disability costs in the 
business community. Reduced profitability in the face of rapidly esca 
lating health care and disability benefit costs led to an examination of 
workers' compensation and other disability programs as significant 
management concerns. No longer could these issues be ignored as sim 
ply a cost of doing business.
Simultaneously, many leading companies, as part of their human 
resource commitment, became actively involved in national and inter 
national efforts to promote the employment and full participation of 
people with disabilities. The Independent Living movement led to
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increased leadership and expectations of the disability community in 
policy efforts. The field of vocational rehabilitation discovered 
employers as necessary partners to achieving further goals. From many 
directions, the economic and social forces converged to set the stage 
for the emergence of the disability management model. This history 
has been adequately summarized by other authors (e.g., Galvin 1986; 
Tate, Habeck, and Galvin 1986; Akabas, Gates, and Galvin 1992; 
Habeck et al. 1994).
In their comprehensive book on the subject, Akabas, Gates, and 
Galvin (1992) define disability management as
a workplace prevention and remediation strategy that seeks to pre 
vent disability from occurring or, lacking that, to intervene early 
following the onset of disability, using coordinated, cost-con 
scious, quality rehabilitation service that reflects an organizational 
commitment to continued employment of those experiencing 
functional work limitations. The remediation goal of disability 
management is successful job maintenance, or optimum timing for 
return-to-work... (p.2, emphasis added).
Disability management, effectively implemented, is intended to 
achieve a win-win situation that addresses the reciprocal economic and 
humanistic needs of the true stakeholders in disability management, 
namely, employers and employees. Common interests that can be 
achieved through an effective program include reducing the risks of 
injury and illness, retaining productivity, effectively using human 
resources and health care services, improving financial security, avoid 
ing adversarial relationships, and achieving the requirements of dis 
ability legislation.
The interest of the business community in disability management 
has been astounding. Since early reports of significant cost savings 
began to circulate a decade ago, there has been an explosion of pro 
grams. Employers by the thousands have embraced disability manage 
ment techniques as a way to combat the upward spiraling of disability 
costs and, often, to demonstrate commitment to the well-being of their 
employees. Disability management conferences abound, and virtually 
every insurance carrier has developed a disability management product 
in response to this interest. In 1993, a survey of 1,050 companies 
revealed that more than 84 percent were actively attempting to control
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their workers' compensation costs through various disability manage 
ment techniques (Towers Perrin 1993).
During the last few years, a growing number of organizational case 
studies and empirical efforts have documented the dramatic cost reduc 
tions achieved in these initiatives. Every company is unique in the spe 
cific constellation of job risks, human resources, and business factors 
that must be taken into account in tailoring a disability management 
program to meet its needs. Nevertheless, the literature indicates several 
traits that successful disability management programs share. The 
essential components, adapted from reviews by Schwartz et al. (1989) 
and Habeck (1991), are as follows:
1. Company wide commitment to reduce disability costs and pro 
vide needed assistance to encourage return to work
2. Analysis and modification of related benefits and policies to 
support disability management objectives
3. Comprehensive assessment of corporate needs, experiences, 
and responses to injury and illness incidents
4. Organization of the disability management initiative across lev 
els and locations, with clearly assigned responsibilities and 
accountability among all necessary people and operating units
5. Creation of an integrated, usable, and effective information sys 
tem to document, analyze, manage, and evaluate relevant data 
about incidence, employees, costs, services, and impact
6. Educational efforts directed toward managers, supervisors, and 
line workers to create understanding and involvement in disabil 
ity management efforts
7. Active use of safety and prevention strategies to avoid disability 
occurrence
8. Early intervention and ongoing monitoring for health risks and 
disability cases
9. Contact with the injured/ill employee and the treating physician 
within 24 hours of impairment onset
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10. Facilitating early return to work of disabled workers through an 
organized process that provides modifications in assignments, 
hours, and/or duties
11. Systematic procedures for effective use of health care and reha 
bilitation services
12. Writing an individual plan of service and return to work by the 
responsible case manager with the participation of the 
employee
13. Using professional expertise to design accommodations that 
permit workers with disabilities to perform work in a satisfac 
tory manner
14. Collaboration with public and private agencies to provide nec 
essary mental health and rehabilitation services
15. Use of incentives in benefit design, cost accounting, and perfor 
mance evaluation to encourage participation of employees, 
supervisors, and managers
One can presume that, if there is this much interest by the private sec 
tor in a specific set of techniques, there must be a substantial payoff.
Empirical Evidence on the Impact of Disability Management
Although very limited research evidence is available to document 
and quantify the impacts of these practices, there are a few studies that 
provide clear support for the significant effect of the organization's 
behavior on the disability experience of the company and its employ 
ees. For example, Rousmaniere (1989) and his colleagues found the 
most important cause of variation in disability impact among 24 hospi 
tals in New England to be the hospital's internal system of risk man 
agement and post-injury response. Rousmaniere (1990) has further 
asserted that how a company responds to and manages injuries deter 
mines roughly 50 percent of the costs. Similarly, according to the 
National Rehabilitation Planners organization (1993), companies can 
reasonably expect to reduce workers' compensation costs by 25 to 30 
percent after the first year of implementing a disability management
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program, with nearly twice those savings realizable when long-term, 
inactive cases are more effectively resolved.
Lewin and Schecter surveyed 77 companies in 1989 and found that 
human resource policies were significantly related to disability inci 
dence. Use of employee involvement programs, conflict resolution pro 
cedures, workforce stabilization measures, and disability management 
policies were each inversely associated with levels of lost work days 
due to occupational and nonoccupational illnesses and injuries (Lewin 
and Schecter 1991).
Two recent studies of disability prevention and management in 
Michigan demonstrate the impact of employer practices on the fre 
quency of disability. The first study, based on a nonrandom survey of 
124 firms, explored the hypothesis that a significant portion of the vari 
ability between workers' compensation experience in different compa 
nies was due to internal actions that were within the employer's control 
(Habeck et al. 1991). The following findings and conclusions were 
reached:
1. Great variability, at least tenfold differences, could be found 
between the workers' compensation claim rates of the firms with 
the highest and lowest claims within each of 29 industries stud 
ied.
2. Only part (25 percent) of this variability in claim rate could be 
explained by industry, size, and location of the firms.
3. Firms with high claims incidence had twice as many injuries but 
had four times as many workers' compensation claims, support 
ing conjecture that there are two distinct processes involved in 
disability management. The first portion involves strategies that 
prevent potentially disabling incidents from occurring, and the 
second involves managing the incident after it occurs, with each 
process contributing substantially to eventual outcomes.
4. Organizational characteristics, such as unionization and tenure of 
the workforce, are also related to the claim rate.
5. Favorable claims experience (i.e., a low claim rate) is signifi 
cantly related to the managerial philosophy and the particular 
policies and practices adopted by the firm, including an open
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managerial style, a positive human resource orientation, more 
rigorous pursuit of safety and preventive interventions, and spe 
cific procedures to manage disabilities. In regard to the latter, 
firms that had lower claims rates reported significantly more fre 
quent use of employee assistance resources, light duty and modi 
fied work to help restricted individuals resume employment, and 
procedures to promote supervisors' efforts to assist in the return 
to work of injured employees in their departments.
The second study was conducted to quantify the impacts of specific 
workplace policies and practices on the incidence and outcomes of 
work-related disability within firms (Hunt et al. 1993). The impacts of 
disability prevention and management behaviors were estimated in a 
multivariate analysis that controlled for a wide range of organizational 
factors, using a random, cross-sectional survey of 220 firms in seven 
industries. The results demonstrate that companies engaging more fre 
quently in behaviors defined as "Safety Diligence" and "Proactive 
Return-to-Work" experienced significantly fewer cases with lost work 
days, fewer total lost workdays, and less frequent workers' compensa 
tion claims; in sum, they experienced less work-related disability.
Specifically, firms that reported 10 percent more frequent achieve 
ment of Safety Diligence (disability prevention) experienced 17 per 
cent fewer lost workdays per 100 employees. Safety Diligence is 
interpreted as the rigorous behaviors of companies that act on their 
stated safety goals and put their safety measures into continuous prac 
tice. These behaviors have been accepted by managers, supervisors, 
and employees as an integral part of their regular functions.
Firms that reported 10 percent more frequent achievement of Proac 
tive Return-to-work (disability management) experienced approxi 
mately 7 percent fewer lost workdays per 100 workers. Proactive 
Return-to-work is interpreted as supportive, company-based interven 
tions for personally assisting those involved in an injury or disability, 
from the beginning of the incident to its positive resolution. The 
actions and responsibilities of individuals within the company and 
external providers are spelled out and related to the ultimate goal of 
resumption of employment.
Further, these results appear to be enabled and perhaps multiplied by 
the managerial commitment and corporate culture of the organization.
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One observation is that firms that demonstrate their concern and com 
mitment for injured workers receive, in turn, greater trust and coopera 
tion from their employees. This is also manifest in the finding that 
"Disability Case Monitoring," defined as a reactive approach to cost 
containment and claims control, actually was associated with a greater 
incidence of lost workday cases (Hunt et al. 1993).
In addition to the survey, on-site plant visits were made to a subsam- 
ple of 32 firms in order to verify the quantitative findings and to gain 
operational understanding of the company behaviors that contributed 
to low disability rates. The initiatives of successful firms are summa 
rized as follows:
1. Extensive use of data to measure performance and identify prob 
lems
2. Analysis of problems to identify the root causes of injury and 
work disability and to target interventions accordingly
3. Receipt or development of the active support of top management 
for the goals, policies, and procedures undertaken
4. Education of labor to understand the relevance of safety and dis 
ability performance to the well-being of the company and to 
themselves
5. Immediate response to identified problems, which convinces 
labor and supervisors of the genuineness of management's con 
cern and determination
6. Realization that their actions and performance in safety are 
related to their disability performance and to workers' compen 
sation costs
7. Movement upstream in prevention through ergonomic initiatives 
in design
8. Development of effective working relationships with designated, 
knowledgeable, and responsive health care providers
9. Maintenance of an active role in case management, even when 
professional services are used, in order to keep the company in 
control of the process
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10. Implementation of the return-to-work process in a systematic 
way throughout the organization, yet tailoring the process to 
meet the needs of the individual situation and maintaining a tran 
sitional perspective in accommodations made
These findings support a causal connection between the disability pre 
vention and management policies and practices of a firm and disability 
performance results. The strategies of prevention and management 
have both been shown to be effective in reducing workplace disability 
in those firms that have implemented them rigorously. As expected, 
prevention strategies have a higher payoff, but management techniques 
have also been effective at reducing the total incidence and severity of 
work-related disability.
Case management is one of the techniques included under the 
broader disability management umbrella. One example of its applica 
tion to Social Security claimants will be reported. An experimental 
design was used to test an independent case manager model with per 
sons who had applied for Social Security disability benefits (Hester et 
al. 1990). Over 3,850 applicants were referred to the project. After rig 
orous screening for probable success, a final selection of 753 persons 
(20 percent) was made of those felt to be eligible for return to work.
These individuals were assigned to one of three groups. The first 
was an early referral group, comprised of individuals who were offered 
case management services to promote return to work within two weeks 
of their application for benefits. The second was a late referral group, 
in which participants were offered the same case management but not 
until after they had been approved for benefits. The third group was a 
control. Case management services included physician contact; an 
assessment of vocational skills, with a work evaluation if indicated; job 
development with former employers, if possible; referral to state voca 
tional rehabilitation agencies for skill training; and direct placement 
services. Among the relevant findings were the following:
•only 6 percent in the late referral group accepted services, as 
opposed to 22 percent in the early referral group;
• 46 percent of those who accepted services were employed at the 
end of the project, as opposed to 13 percent of those in the control 
group; and
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• 21 percent in the early referral group returned to work, as opposed 
to 3 percent in the late referral group.
These observations indicate that a case management approach using 
early intervention (even though six months or more after onset of dis 
ability) may be particularly useful before disability benefits are 
awarded for encouraging return to work for those still in the applicant 
stage. While these empirical research findings are very limited, they do 
strongly suggest that disability prevention and management techniques 
work for reducing the incidence and consequences of work-related 
injuries in the private sector. Some of the techniques may even work 
with DI claimants.
Private Sector Examples
In an attempt to determine how particular elements are implemented 
in private sector disability management programs, and how they might 
impact Social Security Administration (SSA) program concerns, we 
conducted a set of nine case studies. They were meant to represent a 
broad range of private sector experience, but not necessarily "best 
practice," since much more systematic survey work would be required 
to determine just what best practice really is. We talked with some self- 
insured employers from widely divergent sectors of the economy, 
insurance carriers with very different books of business, and varied 
types of service providers. Due to the limitations of space, just three of 
these examples are presented here: one self-insured employer, one 
insurance carrier, and one service provider. 2 A summary of the lessons 
learned is provided at the end of the section.
Owens-Corning Fiberglas
Owens-Corning Fiberglas is a global manufacturer of fiberglass 
products. The firm has 50 U.S. plants with about 12,000 employees.
Approach to Disability Management and Return to Work
Owens-Corning characterizes its approach as an "aggressive stance" 
toward disability management and return to work. Owens-Corning has
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taken corporate responsibility for all of its claims, including work- 
related and nonwork-related disabilities. The company has brought the 
process in-house and no longer relies solely on third parties. This 
approach was adopted in response to significant rises in costs in all dis 
ability areas and to anticipated changes due to national health care 
reform. The goal is to reduce disability costs as a means of increasing 
company profit, but to do so in a way that is consistent with corporate 
principles of (1) customer satisfaction, (2) individual dignity, and (3) 
shareholder value.
Specific Interventions
The major features in the administration of the Owens-Corning 
approach include the following:
1. A site disability case manager is used to coordinate all activities 
and provide case management services;
2. Case management begins on day one of the occurrence;
3. Benefit checks are cut in-house to assure prompt payment;
4. Performance standards have been tightened for third-party 
administrators of the company's plans;
5. The company has changed vendors for its long-term disability 
insurance to one that has a progressive disability management 
philosophy and shares the firm's vision;
6. Corporate oversight is used to address responsibility for overall 
disability outcomes;
7. Human resource managers and supervisors at all plants were 
brought in for education regarding program goals and operation; 
and
8. Provisions for disability management and return to work have 
been incorporated into contract negotiations with the company's 
represented groups.
Expected Outcomes
Owens-Corning stipulated the outcomes that should be accom 
plished by the end of the first three years of the program, which was
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implemented in 1992. These outcomes included a 10 percent reduction 
in total disability costs, including indemnity benefits and medical 
costs; a 10 percent reduction in lost workdays; and a 10 percent 
increase in the use of modified, restricted workdays. In less than two 
years, each of these three goals had already been achieved. In 1992, the 
firm's disability cost total was estimated at $25 million; the current 
goal is to reduce these costs to $15 million by 1998 (a 40 percent 
reduction).
Relationship to the Social Security System
Owens-Corning sees Social Security as an added benefit. Owens- 
Corning recognizes that it cannot provide for all needs and that Social 
Security represents an important resource to the corporation. The firm 
provides assistance to its employees in applying for DI, including pro 
vision of information for the applicant to carry to the SSA if needed.
UNUM Insurance Company
UNUM Corporation is a specialty insurance holding company 
whose affiliates include UNUM Insurance Company of America, a 
leading provider of disability insurance and of employee benefits, 
long-term care, and retirement products.
Approach to Disability Management and Return to Work
Disability management and return to work at UNUM are best pic 
tured as a continuum. The preferred disability management activity at 
the beginning of the continuum is disability prevention and stay at 
work. To that end, UNUM works with high-risk employers at an orga 
nizational level to identify trends in claim causes that suggest preven 
tion activity, such as job restructuring, ergonomic engineering, or 
training in how to work more safely. 3 The Long-term disability (LTD) 
product offers an Employee Assistance Program (EAP) for help with 
personal issues that can contribute to disability.
Further along the continuum, if a person does have an impairment 
and a functional limitation that prevents work, early intervention is 
important. Under short-term disability (STD) policies, that can happen 
much sooner than in LTD where there is a 90-to-180 day waiting 
period. Where UNUM provides both STD and LTD, an STD objective
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is early intervention and management to prevent or minimize an LTD 
claim. UNUM also provides stay at work services for employees. Stay 
at work services include functional assessment of the person and the 
job, along with identifying and paying for job modifications within 
certain limits.
Specific Interventions
From the insurance carrier perspective, a plan design that sets wait 
ing periods and replacement rates that provide significant incentives to 
return to work is an important management tool. Collection of com 
plete impairment and work information is also key to making a fair 
decision regarding the person's functional ability in relationship to 
clearly stated job demands. These facts determine if the definition of 
disability is operable and if the individual is entitled to benefits.
For STD, the major tool is duration management according to 
guidelines that indicate how long individuals may not be able to per 
form the functions of their jobs or occupations, considering their age 
and impairment-related functional restrictions and limitations. Using 
these guidelines, expectations of recovery and return to work are set 
when the claim is approved, causing people to think of return to work 
from the beginning. For LTD, a case plan is set and return-to-work 
expectations are conveyed, but with less formal duration guides. For 
both STD and LTD, if expected recovery does not occur, claims man 
agers work with treating physicians to review the medical aspects of 
claims and the individual's job functions, in order to facilitate return to 
transitional or modified employment.
Specific management protocols are developed for the more prob 
lematic impairment categories such as psychiatric, cardiac, maternity 
(STD primarily), and chronic back pain cases with no objective medi 
cal findings. These protocols involve specific physician questionnaires 
and physical/functional evaluation. Regular follow-up is used to track 
progress and to communicate with employee, employer, and the treat 
ing physician in pursuit of the case plan.
UNUM has developed a copyrighted return-to-work prediction 
scale, which claims specialists use as a guide for identifying rehabilita 
tion candidates with return-to-work potential. For persons who have 
both STD and LTD eligibility, rehabilitation potential is assessed dur 
ing the STD claims management for those likely to go on to long-term
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disability. In some circumstances, case managers will use outside ven 
dors for rehabilitation services, where there is likelihood that such ser 
vices can return the claimant to work. A cost-benefit formula is applied 
based on the cost of the services, the cost of providing present and 
future benefits, and employer and employee motivation. For long-term 
disability, about 18-20 percent of new claimants are reviewed and 
accepted for rehabilitation.
Expected Outcomes
Success is measured by company profits as well as by customer 
(both employer and employee) satisfaction. Outcomes for long-term 
disability claimants are tracked based on the relationship between the 
cost of the intervention that UNUM will cover and the projected sav 
ings in future benefits that would have been paid if the person had con 
tinued on claim status (the industry calls this reserve release). By this 
calculation, there has been a return in the range of $5.00 to $7.00 for 
every $1.00 expended over the last three years. Outcomes are also mea 
sured in terms of client satisfaction and recoveries, and, of course, in 
increased sales and renewals of insurance policies.
Relationship to the Social Security System
There is a formal Social Security referral program in the LTD claim 
process. Social Security is a consideration in setting up a case plan for 
a claimant. However, return to work is the first goal, and Social Secu 
rity referrals are made based on the severity and duration of the impair 
ment and when other efforts to achieve return to work are not 
successful. UNUM's benefits are in addition to those of Social Security 
and the LTD insurance price reflects this potential offset.
United Health Care
United Health Care (UHC) is one of the largest health maintenance 
organizations (HMOs) in the country, with over 2.7 million enrollees. 
UHC has purchased a workers' compensation preferred provider net 
work (FOCUS) to augment integrated disability management services, 
starting with the medical event. The organization's disability manage 
ment services are discussed from the perspective of a vendor that mar-
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kets integrated disability management to insurance companies and 
large employers.
Approach to Disability Management and Return to Work
UHC provides a "managed care" approach, assisting clients in inte 
grating their occupational and nonoccupational medical and disability 
management programs. From the onset of a claim, employees and their 
families have a specific primary care nurse as their contact for health 
care education, utilization review, and disability management services. 
This nurse communicates with the attending physician, the employer, 
and the claims payor(s) to negotiate an effective treatment plan that 
includes early return to appropriate transitional/modified work as parl 
of the recovery process.
Specific Interventions
Depending on clients' utilization of services, key features could 
include the following:
• centralized disability application processing for STD/LTD claims;
•early intervention by a primary care nurse (or masters-prepared 
social worker), who contacts the employee, employer, and provider 
within two business days of notification;
• health care utilization management, including preferred providers 
and second opinion/independent medical examination services;
• telephonic return-to-work coordination with the employer, utiliz 
ing on-site resources as needed for job accommodation, ergonomic 
evaluation, etc.;
•comprehensive measurement and reporting to evaluate trends, 
demonstrate impact, and continuously improve the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the program;
•employer program development support to clarify internal roles 
and responsibilities, identify transitional work opportunities, and 
influence attitudes and cultural expectations within the organiza 
tion;
• rehabilitation vendor selection and management;
262 Disability and Work
• specialized injury prevention programs for cumulative repetitive 
trauma and back conditions;
• maternity education and high-risk pregnancy programs;
•chronic disease management programs based on client-specific 
trends.
Expected Outcomes
Outcome indicators include the average length of disability, total 
wage replacement benefits paid, and total medical costs by diagnosis/ 
procedure and by work location. In a voluntary referral program, a 
recent employer client report indicated that 67 percent of referred 
claims experienced an average 31 percent reduction in the total number 
of weeks of disability, as compared to the attending provider's initial 
plan. However, only a small percentage of the client's total claims were 
managed. In a mandatory referral program, 41 percent of claims were 
positively impacted with a 15 percent average reduction in the total 
weeks of disability. The program objective is a minimum five-to-one 
return on investment. While these results probably represent outstand 
ing examples, it seems clear that disability outcomes are amenable to 
influence.
Summary
Each of these examples illustrates different aspects of the disability 
management continuum. Owens-Corning takes a stance typical of pro 
gressive self-insured employers that are trying to manage their disabil 
ity costs aggressively. The company uses a case manager model with 
obvious corporate commitment to communicate among the players, 
solve problems, and coordinate services for a positive outcome. 
UNUM emphasizes prevention, early intervention, and incentives in 
addition to case management services for difficult categories of disabil 
ity. The insurer also makes an explicit judgment about the costs and 
benefits of intervening in specific cases in particular ways. United 
Health Care uses a traditional managed care model with a strong 
return-to-work focus. All seem to promise substantial returns in the 
form of lower costs of disability, either through reduced duration, 
lower incidence, and/or savings from better process management.
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Clearly, not all of the disability management tools developed in the 
private sector are completely relevant for the DI or SSI programs. For 
example, while prevention of disability is critically important in the 
private sector, it is hard to imagine how SSA could directly affect the 
incidence of disabling conditions. Early intervention has been shown 
to be crucial in private sector experience, and many believe the first 24 
hours is critical to the eventual outcome. However, with a five-month 
waiting period, it is difficult to see how SSA could achieve early inter 
vention in this same sense. Another consideration is that there is no pri 
vate parallel to SSA concerns about children with disabilities.
In addition, in a very real sense, SSA must deal with the failures of 
private sector disability management treatments, i.e., the cases of those 
people who still have not returned to work despite private efforts. So 
the scope for action at SSA may be very different than in the private 
sector. One obvious observation is that the lessons from the private side 
of the economy are likely to be more relevant for the population with 
recent work experience. Nevertheless, there are some well-established 
disability management principles that might transfer to public pro 
grams, such as rationalization of incentives, a proactive return-to-work 
philosophy, and case management techniques.
Policy Implications
We will begin with a description of the SSA disability determination 
and return-to-work procedures of the past. 4 Then, we will recount the 
lessons from private sector disability management efforts and examine 
their applicability to Social Security programs.
Critique ofDI Process
For adults, the current approach to determining eligibility for DI 
benefits basically works to convince individuals that they belong to one 
of two categories. Either they have relatively few limitations and can 
manage on their own, or they have limitations so severe that they can 
never again be productive members of society on a competitive basis. 
Further, the system provides little support or encouragement for either
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group to obtain employment. Only a select few in the second group are 
referred to the state/federal system of vocational rehabilitation, and this 
occurs only after considerable time has elapsed since their previous 
labor market experience. These individuals are then supposed to make 
an immediate reversal in their self-concepts. Suddenly, they have 
become potential workers, without the benefit of any intervention, 
other than the passage of time, to bring about this considerable change.
This approach to disability is counter to conventional wisdom and 
available research, which suggests that a focus on ability and early 
intervention is required to prevent persons from losing touch with their 
identification as workers. It is not surprising that only a small percent 
age of those referred to vocational rehabilitation are rehabilitated. The 
public resources available through the Social Security system are sim 
ply not designed to help adults with disabilities achieve employment. 
In fact, the system may actually encourage disability through factors 
such as excessive delays in processing claims, over-reliance on medical 
evidence in determining disability, and insufficient or nonexistent dis 
ability management tools.
First, the time that elapses between the onset of disability and the 
determination of eligibility for benefits can be months, if not years. 
Some of this cannot be avoided if there must be a statutory waiting 
period of five months, but SSA reports that the subsequent delays in 
processing are prodigious. According to an internal study by the SSA 
Office of Workforce Analysis, an initial determination of beneficiary 
status from SSA may take up to 155 days from first contact with the 
agency, with from 16 to 26 employees involved, but requires only 
about 13 hours of actual "task time." If the decision is negative and the 
individual appeals, a further 400 days may pass before a final decision 
is received by the claimant, of which only 32 hours is actual task time 
(U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, SSA, 1994, pp. 8-9). 
During all this time, the individual claimant is concentrating on his/her 
disability, rather than on the ability that could be used in an employ 
ment situation.5 This approach discourages motivation to return to 
work and minimizes personal investment in productivity-restoring 
activities.
Second, the primary data used to assess eligibility for benefits are 
medical in nature, hence input from physicians often is the deciding 
factor. Although medical information is certainly critical to the deci-
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sion process, almost exclusive reliance on it obscures the reality that 
disability results from a complex array of factors. The preeminence of 
medical diagnostic criteria perpetuates a model that focuses on disabil 
ity rather than ability. It also deflects attention from the variety of inter 
ventions or environmental changes known to be able to remove or 
ameliorate many of the functional limitations producing disability, as 
called for in more contemporary public and private policy.
Third, there is no real case management built into the system. There 
seems to be an assumption that the only factor to consider is the 
impairment that led to eligibility in the first place. If medically verifi 
able improvement occurs, then there is the chance for a later review of 
a person's condition. However, the review is only for the purposes of 
establishing the severity and duration of the disability and whether 
these remain substantial enough to warrant continued benefits. Again, 
the pressure is to demonstrate disability and limitations, not ability and 
potential participation. Nevertheless, the examples cited earlier in this 
paper suggest significant results are available from case management 
techniques alone.6
Although the employment incentive provisions in the 1980 disabil 
ity policy reforms can support return-to-work activities, practically 
speaking, these are really only useful when people are ready, on their 
own, to make a work attempt. 7 There is no systematic case manage 
ment system to guide a person through effective utilization of these 
incentives, or in obtaining appropriate health care services, or in pursu 
ing education that could qualify an individual for alternative jobs more 
suitable to existing limitations. There is no system to assist treating 
physicians in understanding the functional requirements of specific 
jobs for which the individual might be qualified. Finally, no one works 
with employers to develop appropriate accommodations that can open 
job opportunities by minimizing the impact of limitations, even though 
the employer has this obligation under the ADA. Persons receiving dis 
ability benefits are virtually left to their own devices, and to the 
resources of family members, to overcome the variety of limiting fea 
tures that contribute to their disability.
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Lessons Learned
Some of the problems that have been described are familiar to pri 
vate employers and insurers. However, in recent years the private sec 
tor has improved its experience with disabled workers through 
prevention, early intervention, disability case management, and proac 
tive return-to-work policies of accommodation and rehabilitation. The 
disability management movement in the private sector has been driven 
by the stimulus of unacceptably high workers' compensation and other 
disability costs and has produced a practical, sequential, problem-solv 
ing approach. The public programs can and must follow this same path, 
with the advantage of the past decade of private sector experience to 
draw from in redesigning a comprehensive disability policy. Let us 
review what we have learned from the private sector evidence pre 
sented earlier, recognizing that these lessons are most applicable to 
those disabled individuals who have recently been in the labor force.
Return-to-work Focus
The first lesson is that return to work should be the ultimate goal. 8 
While it is clear that not all persons with disabilities can be expected to 
work, failing to adequately assist individuals with functional impair 
ments to develop the opportunity to be employed, to participate, and to 
contribute is inequitable and inefficient. We must realize that disability 
is a continuum, and a benefit structure that maintains a bifurcated view 
of the world (either disabled or not) is no longer relevant. Our evidence 
shows that return to work is not a disconnected function that occurs at 
some specific point in the treatment process. Rather, it is a commitment 
that evolves out of early intervention and case management activities 
with the individual, the physician, the employer, and others. The 
return-to-work "treatment" does not follow medical treatment and 
maximum medical improvement, as has frequently been the case with 
the tertiary vocational rehabilitation model. It should be part of a com 
prehensive disability management process from day one.
From the company examples reviewed earlier, it is obvious that one 
key to disability management success is the immediate creation, or 
maintenance, of the expectation that the individual has the potential to 
work and will return to work. This requires personal contact and sup 
port, which must be maintained on a regular basis, either in person or
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by telephone. As indicated by the SSA Disability Process Reengineer- 
ing Team, current SSA procedures are far from this ideal (SSA, Plans 
for a New Disability Claim Process, 1994). The proposals of the SSA 
Reengineering Team for a more efficient and inclusive process are cer 
tainly a step in the right direction, but much more could and should be 
done. SSA needs to design ways to partner with private sector employ 
ers, insurance carriers, medical practitioners, and other service provid 
ers to ensure that the return-to-work goal is addressed from the 
beginning of an emerging disability.
Positive Incentives
It may be contentious to talk about financial incentives, but a system 
that encourages people with functional limitations to think of them 
selves as disabled is immoral. A system that effectively limits earnings 
to $500 per month and then threatens to take away all supports if earn 
ings exceed that level does not fit with an ecological model of disabil 
ity. Disability is a continuum, and our support systems should mirror 
that reality. Partial benefits and carefully crafted implicit tax rates are 
needed to maintain incentives for all persons with disabilities to work 
as much as they can.
There are also perverse incentives for other actors in the system— 
employers, insurers, and service providers. Our case studies show that 
many private sector disability claims end with a "pass-off to Social 
Security. There is no motivation for the employer or insurer to stay 
involved beyond that point. Further, there is no real incentive to try to 
prevent this outcome, since it can be regarded as a "success" from the 
narrow point of view. Perhaps it is time to consider experience rating of 
the Social Security taxes that employers pay, in order to encourage pre 
vention of disabilities. SSA needs to consider establishing policies that 
encourage private sector players to serve the public interest.
We need to be sure that all incentives reinforce the social policy 
objective of maximizing the contribution of each individual, of achiev 
ing optimum equity and efficiency, in bringing persons with disabilities 
into the labor force to the extent feasible. Return to work is not appro 
priate for everyone, but we need to make sure that we adequately sup 
port those for whom this is a realistic goal.
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Early Intervention
Early intervention is another lesson from the private sector that can 
not be overemphasized. Private sector insurance carriers and third- 
party administrators have discovered that this is not a question of 
months, but of days. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the ear 
lier the intervention begins the better for the ultimate goal of recovery 
or maintenance of employment. Even after six months, however, there 
is evidence that additional delays are harmful, particularly as compared 
to a system that focuses on return to work and maintains positive 
incentives to promote this goal.
SSA must find a way to reach forward (even into the five-month 
waiting period) to address the needs of individuals with functional 
impairments as soon as possible. Thought might be given to some 
innovative sort of technical assistance, consultative service, and finan 
cial incentives that could assist employers and treatment providers in 
preventing disability and in meeting employers' accommodation obli 
gations under the ADA. An appropriate partnership with SSA could be 
made attractive to all interested parties, bearing in mind that persons 
with disabilities must be the major beneficiaries.
Case Management
The evidence is clear from the private sector that case management 
services save money for both insurance carriers and self-insured 
employers and reduce unnecessary disability outcomes. The marketing 
effort that is currently going into third-party case management services 
indicates that many private sector players understand this relationship. 
The hypothesis that the effect extends to public programs is being for 
mally tested in the ongoing Project Network experiments for SSA cli 
ents (Rupp, Bell, and McManus 1994). Without prejudging the results 
of the research, it should not come as a surprise that investing time and 
energy in managing any process will lead to better outcomes. Evidence 
available from the private sector suggests that efficiency savings of 
from 10 to 20 percent are readily achievable through case management 
techniques alone. When combined with the return-to-work orientation 
and early intervention perspectives that we have suggested, consider 
ably larger gains should be available.
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Final Reflections
Disability management offers a critically important mechanism for 
stemming the tide of individuals who leave employment unnecessarily 
and enter disability systems, while simultaneously addressing the eco 
nomic survival needs of American business and the security of the jobs 
it provides. In a comprehensive view of national disability policy, dis 
ability prevention and management should be seen as the keys to pro 
moting the maximum contribution of all disabled individuals and to 
reducing the public burden of preventable disability.
About 10 years ago, private sector employers began to realize that 
nobody was going to solve the problem for them and that they had to 
do it themselves. It is amazing what has been accomplished in the 
intervening decade at "best practice" companies. Reductions of 50 per 
cent, or more, in work-related disability incidence are possible where 
the company is willing to make the commitment to an integrated dis 
ability prevention and management strategy. Many of these cases have 
now been documented in the literature.
It is certain that public sector programs will show more limited 
gains, because the severity of disabilities encountered is greater, 
because the claimant's connection to the world of work is more tenu 
ous, and because entitlement to public sector benefits is a matter of 
right (Galvin, Dean, and Kirchner 1991). However, it is our obligation 
to make sure that every individual has been given the opportunity and 
the needed support to participate. The private sector has pointed the 
way in developing specific disability prevention and management pro 
grams; it is up to all of us to make sure that the public sector does not 
ignore the lessons that are there to be learned.
NOTES
1. We specifically include stay-at-work efforts under this topic as well.
2. The full content of the interviews is available upon request from the W E Upjohn Institute 
for Employment Research The subjects include Owens-Corning Fiberglas, Rohr, Digital Corpo 
ration, Union Pacific Railroad, UNUM Insurance, Wausau Insurance, United Health Care, Univer 
sity of Cincinnati Medical Center, and S Yangouyian & Associates
3 While UNUM is not a workers' compensation earner, short-term and long-term disability 
benefits are paid during workers' compensation waiting periods and above maximum workers' 
compensation benefit levels
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4 However, see the Plan for a New Disability Claim Process (U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services, SSA 1994) Clearly, SSA has become aware of these shortcomings
5 See Bound (1989) for evidence that under 50 percent of rejected male applicants actually 
return to work We are not suggesting that these people are not disabled, but simply that the longer 
the eligibility determination process requires, the higher the proportion of individuals that will be 
disabled, other things equal.
6. These gains are being examined experimentally in Project Network See Rupp, Bell, and 
McManus (1994) for details of the design
7 See Rethinking Disability Policy (National Academy of Social Insurance 1994), chapter 5, 
for a brief history of DI and SSI policy.
8. Of course, this could be restated as secunng and retaining gainful employment for those 
who have never held a job
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